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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
GEORGE O. WHITE III1 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
      China is considered to be one of the oldest living civilizations on earth.  Until 
the twentieth century, and for essentially five thousand years, feudal lords and kings 
ruled China.  However, since 1979, under Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy, the 
Chinese economy and legal structure have developed rapidly.  China’s domestic 
markets and potential purchasing power is all but measureless.  Most economists 
suggest that China has the third largest economy in the world, has unfathomable 
potential, and is predicted by many to be the most powerful economy by the middle 
of the twenty-first century.  Even prior to being accepted into the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), China had attracted a considerable amount of foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”).  Foreign investors are eager to do business and invest in 
projects in China, but many are not sure about the proper methods for dispute 
resolution if a deal goes bad.  While the overwhelming majority of FDI projects in 
China are successful, inevitably projects go sour, and they will need to be resolved in 
the best interests of all parties.   
 
Problems such as government expropriation;2 lack of transparency and 
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2 Expropriation is “to take possession of, especially for public use by the right of eminent domain, 
thus divesting the title of the private owner . . . to dispossess of ownership.”  WEBSTER’S NEW 
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 683 (3rd ed. 1996).  Chinese law forbids nationalization of 
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obscurity of the law; reliance on a non-public operational code, rather than publicly 
accessible regulations;3 administrative and political control in the form of 
uncoordinated laws and policies at different levels of the Chinese bureaucracy;4 
inconsistent interpretations of the law;5 inadequate fiduciary duty rules for joint 
venture partners;6 and profit restrictions on investments,7 to name just a few,8 are still 
major concerns that foreign investors should be keenly aware of when investing in 
China.  Recent turmoil in Beijing regarding McDonald’s serves as a good example:   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
FDI ventures, including joint ventures, equity joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises.  
However, there are special circumstances when this would be allowed, including “national security 
considerations and obstacles to large civil engineering projects. . . . There have been no cases of 
outright expropriation of [FDI] since China opened to the outside in 1979.”  Id.  But, if there were, 
and they could be proved, Chinese law allows for compensation of expropriated foreign investments, 
but has not defined what the actual terms of compensation would be.  See id.  See Folsom, at 761-64 
(detailing anti-expropriation laws in The Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (1986)). 
 
3  See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 
VA. J. INT’L L. 615, 622 (1994).  “The conflict between the Chinese and Western approaches to the 
law is not helped by the Chinese practice of citing unpublished laws. . . . Under the Western notion of 
law, this practice clashes head on with due process. . . .”  Id.  
 
4  See Anna M. Han, China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In A Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM. L. 
& POL’Y J. 457, 489 (1996) (stating that “[d]espite provisions in the Chinese Constitution to the 
contrary, the confusing and often overlapping lines of authority remains a problematic issue facing 
China’s enterprises.”).  See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited Partnership Joint Venture Model In The People’s 
Republic Of China, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 39 (1998). 
 
5  See Han, supra note 3, at 491-92. 
 
6  See Chow, supra note 3, at 38.   
Current Chinese law does not appear to have an equivalent concept to fiduciary 
duty.  While this means that all non-control groups are exposed to the risks 
associated with the lack of such duty, the local partner in the type of foreign-
controlled joint venture . . . is particularly vulnerable because of the amount of 
control vested in the foreign investor.  This lack of general protection most clearly 
exposes the non-control group to risks where the control group seeks to 
intentionally exploit the non-control group.   
 
7  See Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 277 (1996).  
 
8  Another problem is the concept of requiring “foreign operators . . . [to] generate at least half their 
sales volume from Chinese-made goods.”  See id.   
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Beijing recently ordered McDonald’s to vacate its prize location in a 
shopping district near Tiananmen Square.  The American fast-food 
chain not only has its largest restaurant on the site, as a commitment 
to the Chinese market, but also signed a twenty–year lease . . . . They 
[McDonald’s] have been ordered off the property to make way for a 
development project.  . . . As a result, McDonald’s, one of China’s 
earliest investors, is reviewing its China investment strategy.  
[Meanwhile] [o]ther possible investors, like Ford Motor Company, 
remain on the sidelines.9 
 
Undoubtedly, this example creates an environment of “business disenchantment” 
regarding the Chinese investment market.10  
       
Before foreign investors enter the Chinese market, they should consider 
many unique Chinese cultural and legal concepts.  Only with time will a foreign firm 
begin to understand the Chinese relational conditions and business environment.11  
Therefore, the longer the foreign enterprise functions in China, the more competent 
and efficient it will become at navigating the Chinese bureaucratic malaise and at 
avoiding problematic situations.12  This improved competency and efficiency ranges 
from understanding basic concepts of Chinese culture to understanding how to 
handle arbitration or, if necessary, litigation issues. 
 
                                                          
9  Id.  But see, id. at 268-69.   
One bright shining example for the world and the rest of China to behold is 
Guangdong province, the mainland alter ego of its vibrant neighbor, Hong Kong.  
Guangdong is blazing the path for the rest of China providing regulations 
governing . . . joint ventures and the transfer of land-use rights . . . [W]estern legal 
concepts have taken hold in Shenzhen [as well], courtesy of Hong Kong. . . . 
Whether China can emulate Guangdong’s success and adaptability remains to be 
seen. 
 
10  See id.  While such uncertainty may not bode well for the near-term investment, the Chinese 
government is hastily trying to create a much improved investor environment.  See Part III. 
 
11  See Rajib N. Sanyal & Turgut Guvenli, American Firms In China: Issues In Managing Operations, 9 
MULTINATIONAL BUS. REV., Oct. 1, 2001, at 41. 
 
12  See id. 
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II.  FDI Cultural and Dispute Resolution Considerations 
 
1)  Chinese Culture and Business Relationships: How These Factors Affect FDI 
Negotiations 
 
Understanding Chinese culture is vital to understanding how to effectively 
negotiate in and out of business deals in China.  Unknowledgeable foreigners are 
often baffled by the way Chinese attorneys and businessmen cultivate long lasting 
relationships and negotiate business transactions.  Thus, before negotiating a project 
or venture in China, a few concepts must be understood by potential foreign 
investors and their attorneys.     
 
A)  Face      
 
Saving face is by far the most important concept in Chinese society.  Face is a 
Confucian13 concept meaning “prestige” and “personal character.”14  A loss of face 
can be extremely detrimental to one’s ability to adequately negotiate a deal.  Direct 
and confrontational behavior is an inherent part of most foreign legal and business 
systems.15  However, “Chinese negotiators consider direct and confrontational 
behavior as rude, offensive and losing face.”16  Thus, many Chinese are particularly 
sensitive and will quickly take offense to any remarks that could cause them to lose 
face.  Therefore, when negotiating with Chinese counterparts, foreign investors and 
their attorneys must understand the concept of face during negotiations, or else 
cultural confusions could lead to greater frustrations, ultimately undermining the 
investment or venture opportunity. 
 
B)  Guanxi      
 
Guanxi is another very important idea of Chinese culture that will inevitably 
play a major role in business and legal relationships and negotiations in China.  In 
                                                          
13  See DUN J. LI, THE AGELESS CHINESE 340 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 3d. ed. 1978) (1965) 
(explaining that Confucius was born in 551 B.C. and died in 479 B.C. . . . and taught the virtue of Li, 
which are the concepts of “propriety, ceremony, ritual, rite, mannerism, etiquette, etc.”). 
 
14  Bee Chen Goh, Trade And Investment Negotiation With The Chinese, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT 39 (K C D M Wilde ed., LBC Information Services 2000).  
 
15  Such as the United States legal system. 
 
16  Goh, supra note 13, at 39-40.  
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essence, guanxi is a principle that dictates the way parties relate to each other in 
business transactions.17  Guanxi is “a special relationship individuals have with each 
other in which each can make unlimited demands on the other.”18  Most business 
and professional relationships tend to begin and develop by way of guanxi 
connections.19  “What is uniquely Chinese is the fact the moral sense of obligation is 
so overwhelming that one normally has to comply with requests, unless the request 
itself is impossible, or outside one’s means to perform it.”20  If a refusal of a guanxi-
based request occurs, then the requesting party will lose face.21  Furthermore, the 
value of “good” guanxi cannot be overemphasized; it is extremely important in 
Chinese society.22 
 
C)  Patience, Flexibility, and Compromise  
 
In Chinese society, the idea of reasonableness is considered a constant of 
everyday life.23  Yet, the idea of reasonable contract terms is not the same as in most 
western common law systems.24  Generally, Chinese contract negotiations are broadly 
based, and “seek general principles,” rather than detailed rules explicitly built into the 
contract.25  For example: 
 
[t]he Chinese step back from an actual agreement and begin 
negotiations by presenting a letter of understanding that outlines 
general principles.  U.S. managers are often put off because they want 
to get to details.  They’re not averse to the rhetoric of the preambles, 
                                                          
17  See id.  See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 42. 
 
18  Goh, supra note 13, at 39-40.  
 
19  See id. 
 
20  Id. 
 
21  See supra Part IV.1.A. 
 
22  See Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 43. 
 
23  This is called “chian tao li,” meaning the reasonable way.  See Goh, supra note 13, at 40.  This 
concept started during the time of Confucius; it is a Confucian precept.  See supra note 12.    
 
24  See generally Goh, supra note 13, at 40.   
 
25  See id.   
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but they want to build a relationship on facts.  For their part, the 
Chinese stress friendly introductions as a way of establishing their 
relationship.26 
 
Therefore, the Chinese do not place priority on contractual specificities, but on 
“other social precepts such as mutual benefit, social harmony and long-term 
objectives as their guiding principles in observing the spirit of the transaction.”27  
This concept is deeply embedded in Chinese societal history and culture through the 
teachings and writings of great philosophers such as Confucius (including 
Neo-Confucian philosophies)28 in the Analects,29 Sun Tzu’s Art of War,30 The Book of 
Changes (the I Ching),31 the Tao-te Ching (Book of Taoist Virtue),32 and the Book of 
Mencius.33  Therefore, the Chinese place a premium on an agreement that enables 
“both parties to act flexibly and reasonably and to make compromises as the 
                                                          
26  Id.   
 
27  Id.  See, e.g., ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 1-4 (Lloyd’s of London 
Press 1985) (explaining the “Confucian virtue of compromise”). 
 
28  See LI, supra note 12, at 229-34 (explaining that the emergence of Neo-Confucianism came about 
by the increasing popularity of Buddhism and Taoism during the T’ang Dynasty).  One of the primary 
figures promoting Neo-Confucianism was Chu Hsi (1130-1200), regarded by many to be one of the 
greatest Chinese philosophers of all time.  Id. at 228.  Neo-Confucianism is the Chinese philosophy 
that developed the concept of Yin and Yang.  Id. at 232.  See supra note 26.  See generally PETER 
HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 17-42 
(Hong Kong University Press 1997) (e.g., providing informative insight into the Confucian value 
system and its affect on social order in China). 
 
29  The Analects (circa 479) was a book of Confucius’ sayings compiled by his disciples shortly after his 
death.  See CORNE, supra note 27, at 71.  The basic premise behind this extremely important Chinese 
philosophy is man’s relationship to man, relatives, their gods, ancestors, and the state.  Id. at 76-77. 
 
30  See generally, Sun Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 27-30 (Thomas Cleary trans., Shambhala Publications, Inc. 
1st ed. 1988) (establishing that the book was based on sayings by a great military leader, Sun Tzu, 
during the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) of the Chou dynasty).   
 
31  See Li, supra note 12, at 81.  Deals predominantly with the supernatural, and was claimed by both 
Confucians and Taoists as part of their tradition. 
 
32  See id. at 327.  The primary book of the Taoist belief system and philosophy, which was founded 
by Lao-tzu in the 6th century B.C.  See id. at 84-85.  This was a philosophy based on the ideas of fate 
and the idea of “nothingness;” that nothing is what it really seems to be.  Id. at 85-86. 
 
33  See id. at 77-78.  Book written by the great Confucian philosopher Mencius (372-289 B.C.), which 
stresses man’s inherent good nature.   
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situation so requires while at the same time abiding by the actual objectives of the 
dealings themselves.”34  In essence, the Chinese handle contracts by establishing a 
very general contract, which can then be amended at various times to allow the 
parties greater maneuverability.35  While this may seem rather frightening to the 
foreigner, it is business as usual to the Chinese. 
       
The foreign investor36 must also learn to be patient.  Patience is truly a virtue 
in China, not to mention in almost every other country in Asia.  “[T]o do successful 
business in China you need large reservoirs . . . [of] patience . . .patience . . . [and] 
patience.”37  The Chinese consider patience a valued asset, thus Chinese negotiators 
take a very leisurely approach when negotiating investment contracts and ventures.38  
Furthermore, the Chinese place strong emphasis on “poise, reason, and 
self-control[;]”39 impatient and negative behavior is heavily frowned on.40  
 
2)  The Consultation Process – The Culturally Preferred Method Of Dispute Resolution 
       
Most foreign investors generally consult with lawyers before and during the 
process of FDI negotiations.  However, the Chinese do not normally consult with 
lawyers because such consultation would infer a mistrust of the parties involved in 
the negotiations.41  In fact, lawyers are normally only brought in after the FDI 
contract has already been negotiated.42  Thus, when a problem with the agreement 
arises, or when a problem arises during the life of the investment or venture, the 
                                                          
34  Goh, supra note 13, at 41.   
 
35  See id. 
 
36  “Wei-gorin” in Mandarin Chinese.  See generally JOHN DEFRANCIS, BEGINNING CHINESE (Yale 
University Press 2nd ed. 1976) (1964). 
 
37  Goh, supra note 13, at 42. 
 
38  See id. 
 
39  Id. 
 
40  See generally id. 
 
41  See Graham, supra note 6, at 254.   
 
42  See id. 
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Chinese always prefer to settle the dispute by amiable consultation.43   
 
Consultation is the preferred way to solve disputes, “and has been the main 
method for settling disputes for thousands of years.”44  Most Chinese FDI regulative 
devices stipulate that if a dispute arises, the parties should try to settle the dispute 
through consultation.45  Although China is a member of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and has ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
“New York Convention”), the Chinese place a strong emphasis on resolving disputes 
through informal consultation.  Furthermore, consultation is the most natural form 
of dispute resolution for Chinese enterprises, primarily because “Chinese culture and 
attitudes … favor [ ] harmony and good relationships between people [and 
enterprises] and . . . most Chinese . . . would prefer a compromise reached by 
themselves to a decision imposed by another.”46  At its core, this exemplifies the true 
spirit of the Chinese; control.       
       
Consultation47 is simply an attempt to discuss, negotiate, and resolve a 
dispute between the parties.48  Consultation is an informal method of voluntary and 
friendly discussion between the parties.49  While Chinese regulations and laws do not 
                                                          
43  See  Zhang Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on 
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, 8 N.W. J. INTL. L. & BUS. 59, 97 (1987). 
 
44  Gary J. Dernelle, Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s Republic of China, 6 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 331, 357 (1994).  See generally Part IV.1.C.  See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, 
at 43 (inferring that starting with this process will help build good relations with the local 
governments and businesses involved).  Studies have suggested that the better the foreign enterprise 
communicates with the Chinese government, the easier it is to maneuver within the Chinese system.  
See, e.g., id. at 42. 
 
45  See Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358.  See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 43 (asserting that 
“the firm in solving various operational problems . . . reaffrims that positive government cooperation 
can help foreign firms address specific operational problems that they may face”).  Obviously, the 
longer the foreign enterprise has operated in China, the smoother things will operate.  See generally, id.      
 
46  Kui Hua Wang, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW §9.2.2, at 280 (1st ed., 2000). 
 
47  “Xieshang” in Chinese.  See DEFRANCIS, supra note 35. 
 
48  See LEE, supra note 26, at 9-10. 
 
49  See John S. Mo, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 368 (Wang 
Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., Sweet & Maxwell Asia 1997).  
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directly explain how to conduct the consultation process,50 both parties must first 
agree to “consult each other to determine the rights and liabilities and to obtain the 
truth from facts.”51  Informal consultation starts at any agreed time and ends once 
the parties have either achieved their goals or abandoned the consultation process.52  
This is not a method of “compromise through concession and apportionment of 
liabilities.”53  While consultation is premised on the idea of fairness and “fully-
informed voluntariness,” parties can take advantage of each other or make certain 
unfair concessions.54  For an agreement to be binding, both parties to the 
consultation must be happy with the final result.55  “A dissatisfied party may renege 
on the agreement and resort to other means of settlement such as arbitration or 
litigation.”56  Furthermore, while it is a rather ad hoc process and can be abused by the 
more powerful and influential of the parties, consultation serves as a very good 
starting point to resolve disputes between both foreign and Chinese parties in FDI 
disputes.  
 
3)  The Mediation Process – The Favored Back-up To Consultation   
 
While consultation is the preferred method for resolving FDI disputes in 
China,57 mediation58 is by far the second most preferred method, and is generally 
                                                          
50  See id. 
 
51  LEE, supra note 26, at 10. 
 
52  Id. at 10-11. 
 
53  Id. at 10. 
 
54  See Mo, supra note 48, at 368-69. 
 
55  Id. at 369. 
 
56  Id. 
 
57  See International Trade Administration, supra note 1.  See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97. 
 
58  In China, mediation and conciliation are synonomous with one another.  Here, to avoid confusion, 
mediation will be used for ease of understanding and reading.  [Mediation/conciliation is] a consensus 
based dispute resolution process in which the parties to a dispute meet with a third party [the 
mediator] to discuss mutually acceptable options for resolution of the dispute.  The [mediator] has 
some input into the resolution of the dispute in the sense that the [mediator] encourages the parties 
to consider options for resolution, which are fair in all circumstances.  Wang, supra note 45, §9.3.1 at 
282.   
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considered to be part of the same process as consultation.59  Like consultation, the 
origins of mediation are “deeply rooted” in Confucian philosophy, which strongly 
discourages social conflict due to its possible obstruction with the natural order of 
life and other intrinsic disharmonious principles.60  Even under the rule of Mao 
Zedong’s long lasting Communist regime, mediation was a powerful tool for 
applying social, political, and economic pressures on problematic enterprises and 
individuals.61  In fact, under Chairman Mao, the Communist party used mediation to 
consolidate its power-base, thereby instituting its policies as way of social control.62  
Today mediation is a favored option for dispute resolution by the Chinese 
government because it embodies certain Communist tenets, such as “communal 
obligations” and “rejects formal judicial mechanisms which [have] traditionally been 
characterized as pre-revolutionary institutions for class manipulation.”63  Hence, the 
link between mediation, consultation, Confucian philosophy, and the Communist 
ideology is deeply embedded in China’s modern business practices and the FDI 
negotiation structure.64  
       
Mediation is considered by most Chinese officials to be the ‘“first line of 
defense’ against the deterioration of ‘disputes between friends,’”65 which could result 
as a dispute between enemies, as often occurs in other forms of dispute resolution, 
most notably litigation.  Mediation is a “pre-arbitration or pre-litigation”66 process.  
                                                          
59  Id. 
 
60  See Parts IV.A-C.  See also Lee, supra note 26, at 11.   
 
61  See Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan, Mediation and Conciliation, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 86 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996).   
 
62  See Lee, supra note 26, at 11 (stating that “In February 1954, with the promulgation of the 
Provisional General Rules Concerning the Organization of the People’s [Mediation] Committees, 
hundreds of People’s Committees were set up throughout the country.”).  These rules “consolidated 
the work of the people with regard to conciliation and placed the conciliation machinery on a proper 
footing.”  Id. at 11-12. 
 
63  Id. 
 
64  See id. 
 
65  Id.  See generally Folsom & Minan, supra note 60, at 86-113. 
 
66  See Lee, supra note 26, at 12. 
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Therefore, when the consultation process is unsuccessful or inappropriate for the 
particular FDI dispute, either party involved may request mediation.67  Considering 
the alternatives, especially the potentially hazardous and opaque process of 
litigation,68 mediation is the safest method for a foreign investor to protect its interest 
in expensive, and rather valuable, FDI projects or ventures.  Furthermore, mediation 
is the safest and most cost-effective way to manage a dispute in a country where 
“lawyers are scarce . . . discovery procedures are limited . . . courts do not possess 
injunctive or contempt powers . . . there is little [ ] liability insurance . . . judges are 
under trained . . . [and] there is a tradition of [Communist] party review of judicial 
decisions.”69     
       
The actual mediation process is quite informal, as procedural issues will not 
arise within the context of the mediation process.70  Essentially, each process is 
molded to fit the particular dispute at hand.71  Although numerous commercial 
dispute laws have been passed in China,72 the most important legal mechanisms for 
commercial or FDI mediation are the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (“China Arbitration Law”),73 the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) rules,74 and the Rules of the Beijing 
Conciliation Centre.75  “[Mediation] has [also] been accepted as a means of dispute 
                                                          
67  See Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358. 
 
68  See Folsom & Minan, supra note 60, at 86-87.  See infra Part IV.5. 
 
69  Id. at 86. 
 
70  See Lee, supra note 26, at 12. 
 
71  See Wang, supra note 45, §9.3.1 at 282.   
 
72  See generally Mo, supra note 48, at 370-81 (detailing all of the various forms of 
mediation/conciliation in China). 
 
73 See Wang, supra note 45, at 284 n.18 (describing that the China Arbitration Law “was passed by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC on 31 August 1994 and became effective on 1 September 1995. 
Articles 51 and 52 [ ] deal with [mediation]”).   
 
74  See Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at Emory 
University School of Law (Jan. 24, 2002).  CIETAC is a very popular Chinese arbitration tribunal 
working under a formalized set of international arbitration rules, however, the tribunal does regularly 
assist “disputing parties” in mediation proceedings.  Id.   
 
75 See generally Wang, supra note 45, at 286-89.  The Beijing Mediation Centre was set-up in 1987 under 
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settlement in Article 128 of the Contract Law [and]. . . Article 14 of the Equity Joint 
Ventures Law.”76   
       
Parties must follow a few basic tenets to initiate mediation.  For example, 
under CIETAC, the following mediation guidelines exist: 1) there must be rules that 
both parties are willing to accept;77 2) mediation “is conducted by CIETAC to 
ascertain the facts and distinguish right from wrong on questions under dispute;”78 3) 
mediation is to lead both parties to a form of compromise;79 4) the parties decide on 
the choice of law provisions to be completely recognized and enforceable;80 5) 
international practices can be used and are generally honored;81 and 6) if an 
agreement cannot be reached or mediation cannot be continued, mediation will be 
terminated and “an examination and oral hearings” can take place in accordance with 
arbitration rules and standards.82  Mediation can be conducted prior to arbitration 
under the CIETAC rules in several ways.  Under CIETAC, mediation includes face-
to-face discussions, discussions over the telephone, and discussions by mail or e-
mail.83  Also, the parties can request that two members of an informal CIETAC 
mediation panel speak with each side separately, thus being a conduit for 
compromise.84  The parties may also have a sole mediator “pass [ ] compromise 
                                                                                                                                                              
the China Chamber of Commerce.  It deals with international commercial mediation and maritime 
mediation.  The Centre’s headquarters are situated in Beijing.  It presently has about 25 local branches 
throughout the country and about 250 listed mediators.  The Centre was set up in response to 
demands for international commercial mediation . . . from the China Chamber of Commerce.  Mo, 
supra note 48, at 380.   
 
76  Wang, supra note 45, at 284. 
 
77  Id. at 285.  These basic mediation tenets were established by CIETAC arbitrator Yanming Huang.  
Id.  
 
78  Id.  
 
79  Id.   
 
80  Id.  
 
81  Id. 
 
82  Id. 
 
83  Id. 
 
84  Id.  
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schemes or convey [ ] opinions to the other party.”85  While CIETAC is by far the 
most popular forum for mediation, other options, such as administrative mediation 
by local or city governments86 or court-conducted mediation, are also available.87   
 
4)  Arbitration  
 
If the parties are unable to settle their dispute through negotiation or 
mediation, arbitration is naturally the next step in the process.88  Even though the 
Chinese prefer negotiation and mediation, arbitration has become, over the last two 
decades, a mainstream form of dispute resolution in China and the primary way to 
resolve international commercial disputes.89  In fact, “[b]etween 1992 and 1997, the 
CIETAC accepted 3,292 international economic and trade cases and resolved 2,793 
of them.”90  This is primarily because foreign multinationals establishing investment 
                                                          
85  Id. at 286. 
 
86  See Mo, supra note 48, at 374-75 (describing that these “organizations have a general power and 
obligation to resolve ‘small’ disputes falling within their jurisdiction in order to strengthen social 
stability”). 
 
87  See id. at 377-79 (explaining that Chinese courts may initiate a mediation session in most 
economic/business cases at any point of the litigation process, if they so desire).  See generally Lee, 
supra note 47, at 13-14 (explaining that this form of mediation dates back to “the Chinese Resistance 
against the Japanese Invasion before the People’s Republic of China was established.  A judge, Ma Xi-
wu, first combined court proceedings with [mediation] in liberated areas”).   
 
88  See LEE, supra note 26, at 15.  See generally Fredrick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of 
Arbitration in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERK. 
J. INT’L. L. 329, 330 (1997) (providing a very thorough discussion on the arbitration process in 
China). 
 
89  See generally Graham, supra note 6, at 254-55.   
Arbitration eventuated, in part, from the Confucian ideal of social harmony and 
conciliation. Historically, such self-regulation kept most “private law” disputes out 
of the state courts, depending instead on local conciliation [or arbitration] and the 
threat of social censure.  [Today,] [a]rbitration and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution represent the mainstream in China.  [f]urthermore, arbitration 
can serve the dual purposes of providing a “face-saving” approach to dispute 
resolution while preserving the underlying business relationship benefiting both 
sides.  [Thus,] [t]he increasing prevalence of long-term contractual relationships in 
international business [and investment] underscores the importance of conciliatory 
dispute resolution mechanisms.   
 
90  Wang, supra note 45, §9.4.2 at 293.     
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projects in China prefer the control and autonomy of this process.91  Many 
international investors view this as a way to get around China’s problematic court 
system.92  Nonetheless, an arbitration clause in an FDI agreement creates a 
contractual obligation to submit any dispute to an impartial tribunal chosen by the 
parties.93  Thus, international commercial arbitration, with regard to Chinese FDI 
disputes, has very appealing qualities, such as procedural fairness, party autonomy in 
choosing the arbitration rules, neutrality, efficiency and cost effectiveness, arbitrator 
competence, and binding awards for the parties to enforce.94  
 
      CIETAC is the main international commercial arbitration commission in 
China.95  In fact, CIETAC is the “sole organization in the [People’s Republic of 
                                                          
91  See generally Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at 
Emory University School of Law (Jan. 8, 2002) (discussing that while the fate of the case does lie with 
a third party, the proceedings must follow what is provided in the arbitration clause in the FDI 
contract).  See supra note 88.  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 87, at 330 (stating that “the key paradox 
is that, while arbitration in China is imperfect, it remains the best alternative for international 
investors”).  
 
92  See generally infra Part III. 
 
93  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 87, at 330.  See also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
§II.1. (Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III, & Arthur T. von Mehren eds., West Group 1999).  An 
arbitration tribunal from practically any country, due to party autonomy, can be chosen by mutual 
agreement of the parties.  See id.  See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97. 
 
94  See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 92, AT §II-§V.  See also Professor 
Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at Emory University School of 
Law (Jan. 8, 2002; Jan. 18, 2002; Feb. 19, 2002).  See John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr , 
Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, in 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 129 (Ralph H. 
Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International Ltd 1996).  But, investment contracts 
often stipulate arbitration in Stockholm because the forum there is considered neutral.  Most Chinese 
contracts stipulate arbitration by [CIETAC].  During the past year, several western participants and 
panel members in CIETAC proceedings raised concerns about the organizations procedures and 
effectiveness.  In one instance, a highly respected American member of an arbitration panel 
threatened to resign from CIETAC over alleged procedural irregularities during consideration [of] a 
case [believing] enforcement of arbitral awards [to be] sporadic.  Sometimes, even when a foreign 
company wins in arbitration, the People’s Intermediate Court in the locality where the foreign venture 
is situated may fail to enforce the decision.  Even when the courts do attempt to enforce a decision, 
local officials often ignore court decisions with impunity.  Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, 
supra note 57.   
 
95  See Wang, supra note 5, §9.4.4 at 297.   
The CIETAC was established in Beijing. . . . It also has two regional offices, one 
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China] authorized to hear non-maritime commercial arbitration cases between 
Chinese and foreign parties.”96  The China Chamber of Commerce originally 
developed CIETAC’s arbitration rules.97  CIETAC is made up of an official Chinese 
administrative body able to exercise its “delegated legislative power under the 
Chinese Constitution and the relevant regulations of the State Council.”98  While 
arbitration is a complex process,99 CIETAC has jurisdiction to cover matters such as: 
international or foreign trade-related disputes, including those related to the Hong 
Kong SAR, Macao, or Taiwan regions;100 disputes arising “between enterprises with 
foreign investment and disputes between an enterprise with foreign investment and 
another Chinese legal person . . . or economic organization;”101 disputes arising from 
project financing;102 or certain special cases stipulated in the administrative 
regulations of the People’s Republic of China.103  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
established in Shenzhen . . . and the other in Shanghai[;] . . . the CIETAC has 418 
arbitrators on its name list for international economic and trade arbitration.  
Among these arbitrators, 25 are citizens of Hong Kong SAR and 112 are 
foreigners, of whom eight are Australians. 
Id.  For an expose on CIETAC, see Paul R. Weber, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL AND 
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 73-75 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar 
Association 2000).  
 
96  Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments, 
and Current Practice, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 389 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International 1996).   
 
97  See Mo, supra note 48, at 384. 
 
98  Id. 
 
99  E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION supra note 92, at §I.  See generally Jerome Alan 
Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, 
AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508-31 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford 
University Press 2nd ed. 1987).     
  
100  See Mo, supra note 48, at 384.  
 
101  Id. 
 
102  See id. 
 
103  See id. 
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      China ratified the New York Convention in 1986104 with a few reservations.  
First, China would only enforce the Convention on the basis of mutual recognition, 
thereby refusing to enforce an award in a non-New York Convention country.  
Second, the Convention would only apply to disputes recognized under Chinese 
law.105  Also, under CIETAC arbitration, an award must be rendered within nine 
months from the date when the arbitration tribunal is formed.106  However, if the 
parties wanted a quicker and more efficient process, they would simply agree in 
writing and apply for the case to be conducted under the Summary Procedure of 
CIETAC.107  Thus, an award could be rendered within thirty days if heard orally, or 
within ninety days of the formation of the arbitration tribunal if the case is examined 
“on the basis of documents only.”108  Finally, and most importantly, all arbitration 
pertaining to commercial or investment matters in China is institutional; there is no 
ad hoc arbitration.109 
 
5)  Litigation – Venturing Into The Undesired World Of Last Resort   
 
The Chinese have a very bad impression of the court process and prefer 
more amicable ways of settling disputes, primarily due to being non-confrontational 
in nature and not wanting to risk losing face.110  However, over the past few decades, 
the Chinese government has established economic court divisions within the legal 
framework to handle civil litigation regarding economic and commercial disputes to 
curtail “speculation, profiteering, and all kinds of criminal activities.”111  It is 
important to note that: 
                                                          
104  See id. at 392.  See, e.g., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III, & Arthur T. von Mehren eds., West Group 1999).   
 
105  See id.  For example, the China Arbitration Law.  See supra Part IV.3.   
 
106  See Wang, supra note 45, §9.4.4 at 299. 
 
107  See id. 
 
108  Id. 
 
109  However, CIETAC does not object to ad hoc arbitration.  See id.  In fact, “[i]n cooperation 
agreements signed between CIETAC and arbitral institutions of other countries, there are provisions 
allowing parties to select UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and form an ad hoc arbitration tribunal.”  Id.   
 
110  See LEE, supra note 26, at 9. 
 
111  Id. at 18. 
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[l]itigation of [a] dispute is possible, but is usually a last resort.  To 
litigate a dispute involving a foreign economic contract in the 
Chinese court system, the foreign economic contract must not 
include an arbitration clause and a written agreement to arbitrate 
must not later be reached.  In practice, few foreigners or foreign 
countries have litigated their contractual disputes.112 
   
Rule of law is still developing in China.113  The court system is still 
predominantly state controlled and opaque in character.  Many Chinese court justices 
and attorneys have relatively inadequate legal training, compared to western 
standards,114 and bias against foreigners in the Chinese court system is 
commonplace.115  Foreign litigants face additional problematic factors such as rapidly 
changing and volatile laws.  Furthermore, Mandarin Chinese, the official Chinese 
language, is required in all court proceedings, and foreign parties can only be 
represented by Chinese counsel.  Collectively, these factors could cause considerable 
hardship and uncertainty in the litigation process for a foreign enterprise.116  
Therefore, a foreign enterprise doing business in China must have a very good 
arbitration clause built into its investment or joint-venture contract, or find an 
alternative means for resolving a dispute in a neutral international forum rather than 
contend with a Chinese court.117 
 
                                                          
112  Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358-59.  See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97.   
 
113  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 92, at 333.  See also Stanley B. Lubman, Sino-American Relations and 
China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL 
AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 9-60 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar 
Association 2000) (detailing the significant legal reforms presently underway in the Chinese legal 
system). 
 
114  See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM & JOHN H. MINAN, LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
169-241 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989).   
 
115  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 92, at 333.  See generally Zheng Zhaohuang, On the Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction of Chinese Courts over Foreign Investment Disputes, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE 
LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 532-45 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press 
2nd ed. 1987) (discussing the role of Chinese courts in disputes involving foreign investment). 
 
116  See Wang, supra note 45, §1.2.9 at 35-36; §1.2.13 at 45; §9.5 at 306-08. 
 
117  See id. at 333-34.  See also Graham, supra note 6, at 254-55.   
 
